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UNCLE SVEN KNOWS BEST:  
THE ECJ, SWEDISH GAMBLING 
RESTRICTIONS, AND OUTMODED 
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
Paul Caligiuri* 
Abstract: The free movement of services is a fundamental tenet of the Eu-
ropean Union’s Common Market. Gambling services’ free movement, 
however, has long been obstructed by municipal gambling restrictions. 
One such restriction in place in Sweden authorized the prosecution of two 
newspaper editors for publishing advertisements of foreign-based online 
gambling operators. In the course of the editors’ appeal from their convic-
tion, the Swedish courts referred questions to the European Court of Jus-
tice regarding the compliance of Sweden’s domestic restriction with Euro-
pean treaty provisions enshrining the free movement of services. The 
Court of Justice provided little guidance, however, when it addressed the 
dispositive question of proportionality; that is, whether Sweden’s law went 
beyond the point needed to affect Sweden’s legitimate underlying policy 
objectives. The court, in its deferent and cursory proportionality analysis, 
employed a standard ill-equipped to account for the effects national gam-
bling restrictions have on the Common Market in the online age. 
Introduction 
 On July 8, 2010, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed 
down a preliminary ruling on questions referred to it by Sweden’s 
Court of Appeals (Svea hovrätt) in Criminal Proceedings Against Sjöberg & 
Another.1 Both disputes stemmed from criminal charges brought against 
two newspaper editors who had published advertisements for foreign 
gambling enterprises.2 The ECJ had been asked to decide whether 
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1 Joined Cases C-447 & 448/08, Sjöberg Åklagaren, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 11, para. 58. 
2 Id. paras. 19–22. 
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Sweden’s ban on the promotion of foreign gambling violated Article 49 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Article 49).3 
 Article 49 prohibits European Union (EU) Member States from 
restricting the free movement of services across national borders within 
the EU.4 In its judgment, the ECJ reasoned that Article 49 did not pre-
clude Sweden’s ban on gambling promotion, because the ban reflects 
Sweden’s legitimate objective of excluding profit-making interests from 
its domestic gambling sector, and is proportional to achieving that ob-
jective.5 
 This holding, however, was premised upon precedent derived in 
part from the notion that a gambling operator has to physically en-
croach upon the territory of a Member State in order to promote itself 
there.6 Yet, online gambling is a large and growing part of the EU’s 
market.7 In its Sjöberg judgment, the ECJ missed an opportunity to in-
troduce a new standard for evaluating the proportionality of Member 
States’ restrictions on the free movement of services.8 Such a standard 
is necessary to uphold Article 49’s effect on the gambling industry by 
confining relevant domestic restrictions to their Member States.9 
 Part I of this Comment provides the factual and procedural back-
ground of the Sjöberg case. Part II presents the ECJ’s relevant Sjöberg 
holdings, its gambling precedents, and brief overviews of the European 
gambling market and EU Member States’ comparative gambling laws, 
                                                                                                                      
3 See id. paras. 1, 27. 
4 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 49, 
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 54 [hereinafter TEC]. This Comment cites to the TEC 
with the pre-Lisbon numbering to conform with the ECJ’s treaty citations in the Sjöberg 
judgment. 
5 Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 45–46. 
6 See, e.g., Case C-275/92, Customs & Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. I-1039, para. 62 
(“[T]he prohibition on the importation of materials intended to enable nationals of that 
Member State to participate in such lotteries organized in another Member State cannot 
be regarded as a measure involving an unjustified interference with the freedom to pro-
vide services.”). 
7 Commission Green Paper on On-Line Gambling in the Internal Market, at 8, COM (2011) 
128 final (Mar. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Green Paper on On-Line Gambling] (stating that, as of 
2008, on-line gambling accounted for 7.5% of the EU’s internal gambling market, and 
adding that the on-line market was expected to double within five years). 
8 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 39–45; cf. Joined Cases C-338, 359 & 360/04, 
Criminal Proceedings Against Placanica & Others, 2007 E.C.R. I-1891, para. 62. (present-
ing alternative to broad domestic gambling restriction that “impinge[d]” on the free 
movement of services). 
9 Cf. Priscilla T. Cheng, Note, Call a Spade a Spade: Barriers to Harmonization and Conflict-
ing Messages in Gambling Laws of the European Community, 36 Brook. J. Int’l L. 693, 704–05 
(2011) (“[T]he [ECJ] generally . . . allows state restrictions even though they conflict with 
the freedom to services.”). 
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framing the proportionality issue in Sjöberg within the larger scheme of 
EU movement-of-services doctrine. Part III explains why Sjöberg pre-
sented an opportunity for the ECJ to introduce a new standard for as-
sessing the proportionality of restrictions on cross-border gambling ser-
vices, and why the court should have seized the opportunity. 
I. Background 
 In 2003 and 2004, two Swedish newspapers, Expressen and Afton-
bladet, published advertisements for gambling organized outside of 
Sweden.10 Four separate for-profit gambling operators—all lawfully or-
ganized in other EU Member States—purchased the ads.11 At the time 
of publication, Otto Sjöberg and Anders Gerdin were the editors-in-
chief and publishers of Expressen and Aftonbladet, respectively.12 
 Swedish authorities prosecuted Sjöberg and Gerdin for violating 
section 54 of the Lotterilag, the Swedish lotteries act that governs all 
domestic gambling activities.13 Section 54 prescribes criminal sanctions 
for individuals who promote domestic participation in commercial 
gambling activities that have been organized abroad.14 
 The Stockholm District Court (tingsrätt) convicted both defen-
dants and ordered each to pay a 50,000 kronor penalty.15 Both ap-
pealed their convictions to the Svea hovrätt.16 Although the Svea 
hovrätt initially declined to hear the appeals, the Supreme Court  
(Högsta domstolen), upon defendants’ petitions, ordered it to do so.17 
 As part of this order, the Högsta domstolen held that Section 54 of 
the Lotterilag might violate EU treaty provisions mandating the free 
                                                                                                                      
10 Joined Cases C-447 & 448/08, Sjöberg Åklagaren, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 11, paras. 19–
21. 
11 Id.; see About the Company, Expekt, http://www.expekt.com/about.do (May 20, 2012) 
(Malta); About Us, Centrebet, http://centrebet.com/cust?action=GoAdmin&content=About 
(last visited May 20, 2012) (Malta); Home Page, Ladbrokes, http://www.ladbrokes.com/ 
home/en (last visited May 20, 2012) (Gibraltar); Home Page, Unibet, http://www.unibet. 
com/ start (last visited May 20, 2012) (Malta). 
12 Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 19–20. 
13 Id. paras. 3, 22. 
14 54 § Lag om ändring i lotterilagen (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1994:1000) 
(Swed.), translation available at http://gamingintelligence.com/legislation/Sweden%20 
Lotteries%20Act%201994.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012). Although this provision purports to 
limit itself to promotions which “particularly relate[] to participation from Sweden,” the 
Sjöberg Court does not say that the ads were anything other than nationally-generic, or that 
Section 54’s qualifying language is important. Id.; see Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 19–20. 
15 Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. para. 23. Fifty thousand kronor is equivalent to roughly 
7500 USD. 
16 Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. para. 24. 
17 Id. paras. 24–25. 
578 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:575 
movement of services between EU Member States.18 This holding 
prompted the Svea hovrätt to stay the appeals and refer to the ECJ the 
question of whether Section 54 of the Lotterilag was compatible with EU 
treaty provisions that provide for the free movement of services.19 The 
ECJ joined the two defendants’ cases for joint hearing and judgment.20 
II. Discussion 
 All questions referred to the ECJ conceded that Lotterilag Section 
54 constitutes a “restrictive policy” under Article 49.21 Once a Member 
State’s law is deemed restrictive, the ECJ considers whether it is justified 
by “overriding reasons relating to the public interest.”22 In Sjöberg, the 
court held that Section 54’s objective is compatible with Article 49 be-
cause it is justified by such concerns.23 
 In its referral, the Svea hovrätt emphasized its finding that the ex-
clusion of profit-making interests from the domestic gambling market is 
vital to Sweden’s gambling policies.24 The ECJ found that this objective 
was a sufficient “overriding reason,” citing both the seminal case Customs 
& Excise v. Schindler—in which it upheld a similar objective proffered by 
the United Kingdom25—and the wide latitude traditionally afforded to 
Member States to establish domestic regulatory schemes.26 Having held 
Sweden’s stated objective for the restriction to be permissible, the court 
then upheld Section 54 because it was proportional to achieving the 
stated objective.27 This determination is particularly relevant to the fo-
cus and analysis of this Comment.28 
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. para. 26. 
19 Id. para. 27. 
20 Id. para. 28. 
21 See Joined Cases C-447 & 448/08, Sjöberg v. Åklagaren, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 11, para. 
27. 
22 See, e.g., Case C-124/97, Läärä v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä, 1999 E.C.R. I-6067, paras. 32–
33. 
23 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 41–42, 45–46. 
24 Id. para. 41. 
25 Id. para. 42; see Case C-275/92, Customs & Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. I-1039, 
paras. 57, 59. 
26 Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 11 para. 43. 
27 Id. paras. 44–46. 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 97–100 (proposing a new standard for evaluating 
the proportionality of national gambling restrictions, based upon the foundation laid by 
earlier case law). 
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A. The ECJ’s Pre-Internet Judgments of the Proportionality of  
Gambling Restrictions 
 The ECJ determines proportionality by assessing whether or not 
the restrictive Member State law in question is “suitable for achieving 
the objective . . . invoked” and “go[es] beyond what is necessary in or-
der to achieve [that objective].”29 “[N]ational legislation is [suitable to] 
ensuring attainment of the objective pursued only if it genuinely re-
flects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner.”30 
 Under Schindler, only the national courts and legislatures pursued 
this inquiry.31 This was due to the ECJ’s determination that the general 
tendency of Member States to regulate gambling, the risk of crime or 
fraud posed by gambling, and the dangers of gambling addiction, all 
merited allowing the United Kingdom to decide for itself what was nec-
essary to accomplish the objectives of its gambling laws.32 
 The court cited Schindler’s holding regarding Member State auton-
omy to determine proportionality in Läärä v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä, which 
concerned the Finnish government’s monopoly on slot machines.33 
Unlike in Schindler, though, the court here engaged in a proportionality 
analysis, holding that the monopoly was proportionate to the objective 
of shifting gambling profits to an operator whose gain would more like-
ly be reinvested in the public interest.34 
 Eight years after Läärä, in Criminal Proceedings Against Placanica & 
Others, the ECJ received preliminary references from Italy questioning 
the legality of a law limiting the total number of gambling licenses is-
                                                                                                                      
29 Joined Cases C-338, 359 & 360/04, Criminal Proceedings Against Placanica & Oth-
ers, 2007 E.C.R. I-1891, para. 49 (citing Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine 
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. I-4186, para. 37). Gebhard lists the re-
quirements of non-discriminatory effect and overriding justification together with these 
two proportionality requirements as four elements of a valid restriction. See 1995 E.C.R. 
para. 37. The ECJ’s analytical flow in contemporary case law, however, seems to separate 
the discriminatory effect analysis from the overriding concern and proportionality analy-
sis. See, e.g., Case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Departamento de 
Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa, [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, para. 60; Placanica, 
2007 E.C.R. paras. 45, 49; Case C-42/02, Lindman, 2003 E.C.R. I-13543, paras. 20–27. In 
Sjöberg, the ECJ instructed the Svea hovrätt that discriminatory effect could invalidate Lot-
terilag Section 54. Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. para. 57. Yet it reaffirmed Gebhard’s elements 
structure by indicating that proportionality is a prerequisite for any law’s compliance with 
Article 49. See id. para. 50. 
30 Liga Portuguesa, [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. para. 61. 
31 See Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. para. 61. 
32 See id. paras. 60–61. 
33 Läärä, 1999 E.C.R. para. 14. 
34 Id. paras. 37–43. 
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sued nationwide.35 The court stated that it lacked a factual basis to rule 
on the law’s validity, but instructed the referring court to determine 
whether the law met the ECJ’s proportionality standards.36 This judg-
ment reaffirmed the court’s reasoning from Läärä and cemented pro-
portionality as a required feature of Member States’ gambling restric-
tions.37 Further, the cases of this period emphasized that national 
restrictions must not “go[] beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
[Member State’s] objective . . . .”38 
B. The Liga Portuguesa Decision: Proportionality and Promotion of  
Online Gambling 
 On September 8, 2009, the ECJ issued a judgment that addressed 
internet gambling.39 In Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional & Bwin In-
ternational, Ltd. v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa, the court was asked 
to rule on the validity of Portuguese laws that imposed fines for offering 
or promoting electronic gambling opportunities identical to those run 
by Santa Casa, Portugal’s government gambling monopoly.40 Bwin In-
ternational, a Gibraltar-based internet gambling operator, agreed to 
sponsor the Liga, in exchange for the Liga’s promotion of Bwin’s gam-
bling website.41 Portugal prosecuted the Liga for promoting games in 
competition with Santa Casa.42 With regards to proportionality, the 
court looked to precedent that recognized the efficacy of gambling mo-
nopolies in constraining illegal activity,43 Portugal’s inability to rely on 
other Member States to effectively regulate their gambling establish-
ments,44 and the suspicion of wrongful activity arising from Bwin’s par-
ticular arrangement with the Liga or internet gambling in general.45 
The court upheld Portugal’s law.46 
                                                                                                                      
35 Placanica, 2007 E.C.R. paras. 4–14, 28. 
36 Id. paras. 57–58. 
37 See Julia Hörnle & Brigitte Zammit, Cross-Border Online Gambling Law and 
Policy 144–52 (Edward Elgar ed., 2010). 
38 Placanica, 2007 E.C.R. para. 62. 
39 Liga Portuguesa, [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. para. 74. 
40 Id. paras. 10–12, 28. 
41 Id. paras. 20–25. 
42 Id. para. 26. 
43 Id. paras. 64–67 (addressing the suitability of the law to attain the stated objective). 
44 Id. para. 69 (addressing the necessity of the law). 
45 Liga Portuguesa, [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 70–71 (addressing the necessity of the 
law). 
46 Id. para. 73. 
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C. Europe’s Online Gambling Market and the Scope of Restrictions 
 To date, the ECJ has exclusively analyzed foreign gambling’s impact 
on national regulatory schemes; it has not analyzed national regulatory 
schemes’ impacts on the Common Market.47 Gambling services in all 
EU Member States generated €75.9 billion in 2008.48 Online gambling 
operators accounted for €6.16 billion, or 7.5% of revenue,49 a figure 
that is expected to increase by nearly seventy percent to €11 billion by 
2012.50 Further, among nineteen remote gambling operators in Europe, 
approximately twenty to thirty percent of remote gambling is done by 
consumers from outside the operators’ respective nations of establish-
ment.51 
 Online gambling in the European Union continues to flourish de-
spite conflicting Member State regulatory schemes and prohibitions 
that restrict market participation.52 As of 2005, “a majority of Member 
States [imposed] specific requirements as to the type of legal entity en-
titled to run [a] gambling activity.”53 Sweden is among that majority 
because it categorically excludes private profit-making operators from 
licensure.54 
 In Sjöberg, the ECJ provided the foundation for the Swedish courts’ 
eventual reversal of the defendants’ convictions, holding Section 54 
invalid for imposing stricter penalties for promoting unlawful foreign 
gambling than it did for promoting unlawful domestic gambling.55 The 
court’s proportionality analysis was brief, however, simply acknowledg-
ing that the gambling operators were for-profit entities, and concluding 
that, because Sweden seeks to reserve its gambling market to public or 
                                                                                                                      
47 See, e.g., id. paras. 64–71. 
48 Green Paper on On-Line Gambling, supra note 7, at 8. 
49 Id. 
50 European Gaming & Betting Assoc., Factsheet: Market Reality 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.egba.eu/pdf/EGBA_FS_MarketReality.pdf. 
51 Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, Study of Gambling Services in the Internal 
Market of the European Union 1422 (2006). 
52 See id. at xxxviii–xli (accounting for legal restrictions as a countervailing force 
against increased usership in the growth of online gambling in Europe). 
53 Id. at xv. 
54 See id. (stating, within that same category, that “[i]n Finland, licences are only issued 
to non-profit national companies,” and therefore supporting the inference that Sweden’s 
very similar restriction is what places it in that category). 
55 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. para. 57; Axel Andén, Speldomen: Gerdin och Sjöberg frias, 
Medie Världen ( June 22, 2011), http://www.medievarlden.se/nyheter/2011/06/speldo 
men-gerdin-och-sjoberg-frias. 
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non-profit entities, prohibiting the advertisement of those operators is 
proportional to that aim.56 
 In reaching its conclusion, the court merely introduced the long-
existing proportionality standard and followed it with language from 
Schindler.57 In Schindler, however, the gambling promotions were sent in 
envelopes specifically addressed to U.K. consumers.58 The advertise-
ments in Sjöberg, however, originated in Sweden, but the court did not 
discuss the scope of their potential audience.59 
III. Analysis 
 The ECJ should adopt a standard to guard against the frustration 
of lawful cross-border gambling services by domestic laws.60 Such a 
standard is necessary because Custom & Excise v. Schindler is outmoded; 
consequently, the Sjöberg court’s reliance on it is faulty.61 
A. Shortcomings of the ECJ’s Reasoning in Sjöberg 
 There are two primary shortcomings in the ECJ’s reasoning in 
Sjöberg.62 First, the language from Schindler upon which the court relied 
is based on outmoded perceptions of gambling, and was undermined 
by subsequent ECJ case law.63 Second, the court’s failure to instruct the 
Swedish courts to examine Section 54’s effects outside of Sweden ig-
nored the law’s impact on the larger European online gambling market 
and economy as a whole.64 
1. Schindler: Caught in the Middle of Evolving Perceptions 
 Public perception of gambling in many Western nations became 
more forgiving in the years prior to Schindler,65 with “[t]he moral stig-
ma, which had previously marked gambling . . . largely vanish[ing]” by 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 44–45. 
57 See id. paras. 40–43; Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. paras. 57–60. 
58 See Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. para. 4. 
59 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. AG60–AG73, 40–44. 
60 See Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra note 51, at xxxiv. 
61 See infra text accompanying notes 71–77. 
62 See infra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
63 See Per Binde, “You Could Become a Millionaire”: Truth, Deception, and Imagination in 
Gambling Advertising, in Global Gambling: Cultural Perspectives on Gambling Or-
ganizations 171, 171–74 (Sytze F. Kingma ed., 2010); Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 37, 
at 149–54. 
64 See Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra note 51, at xliii–xlvii. 
65 See Binde, supra note 63, at 171. 
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2010.66 The Schindler case arose amidst this change in attitude, but the 
ECJ’s absolute deference to U.K. policy reflected earlier perceptions of 
gambling as morally questionable “incitement to spend.”67 
 The ECJ’s jurisprudence began conforming to newer perceptions 
with a group of judgments including Criminal Proceedings Against Pla-
canica & Others.68 Under the holding in Placanica, a municipal law that 
unduly impedes the provision of services between two other states is dis-
proportionate if it “goes beyond what is necessary in order to achieve 
[its] objective . . . .”69 In Sjöberg, however, the ECJ did not analyze this 
requirement, perhaps following the reasoning of Advocate General 
(AG) Yves Bot, who did not mention necessity aside from opining that 
the court’s reasons for upholding the law in Liga Portuguesa de Futebol 
Profissional & Bwin International, Ltd. v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa 
Casa “apply a fortiori to a measure less restrictive than an outright prohi-
bition of [gambling itself] . . . .”70 This statement suggests that a ban on 
the promotion of unlicensed gambling is patently less restrictive than a 
ban on the provision of unlicensed gambling itself.71 
2. Liga and Sjöberg: Running Back to the Middle of Evolution 
 The AG’s assumption—that a ban on the mere promotion of unli-
censed gambling is less restrictive than a ban on such gambling itself— 
ignores the advertising ban’s effects on foreign States where gambling 
is not so restricted.72 This becomes apparent considering the newspa-
pers’ circulation: Expressen and Aftonbladet together reach approxi-
mately two million daily print readers, and receive almost 2.6 million 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. 
67 Case C-275/92, Customs & Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. I-1039, para. 60; see 
Binde, supra note 63, at 171. 
68 See Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 37, at 149, 151–52. 
69 See Joined Cases C-338, 359 & 360/04, Criminal Proceedings Against Placanica & 
Others, 2007 E.C.R. I-1891, para. 62. 
70 See Joined Cases C-447 & 448/08, Sjöberg v. Åklagaren, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 11, paras. 
AG67, 40–45. The Advocate General acts as a type of permanent amicus curiae to the ECJ. 
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 252, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 158. 
71 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. para. AG67. 
72 See Bernardo S. Blum & Avi Goldfarb, Does the Internet Defy the Law of Gravity?, 70 J. 
Int’l Econ. 384, 387–92 (2006). Although the assertions in this Comment may run con-
trary to this study’s main conclusion, Table 2 does show that the American households 
included in the study averaged approximately one visit to Swedish websites during the 
study period, in addition to all other foreign web visits. Id. 
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daily web views, any number of which could conceivably be foreign.73 
The court may have overlooked this fallacy due to Liga Portuguesa’s de-
parture from the Placanica doctrine when applying proportionality to 
restrictions on internet gambling.74 Liga Portuguesa’s return to Schindler-
era deference to Member States’ policy choices gives the court author-
ity to virtually bypass the analysis of whether a restriction is within the 
bounds of necessity.75 Yet the potential for more widespread foreign 
circulation in Sjöberg ought to have compelled the court to again limit 
its deference to national governments.76 
B. Consequences of the Sjöberg Decision 
 The consequences of the ECJ’s failure to examine Section 54’s 
possible impact on foreign gambling services illustrate why Article 49 
TEC requires a more stringent standard.77 These consequences are two-
fold.78 First, Section 54 could harm lawful online gambling—a growing 
industry—at a time when the European economy faces declining jobs 
and public revenue.79 Second, there is no standard to prevent a more 
extreme restriction from further burdening foreign gambling.80 
1. Online Gambling: Growth During a Time of Contraction? 
 Europe’s economy, like others around the world, reeled after the 
2008 financial crisis.81 Granted, online gambling growth cannot single-
handedly overcome recent job loss and government budget crises, but 
                                                                                                                      
73 See I Siffror [In Figures], Expressen, http://www.expressen.se/omexpressen/siffror 
(last visited May 20, 2012); Siffror [Figures], Aftonbladet, http://www.aftonbladet.se/siffror/ 
(last visited May 20, 2012). 
74 See Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 37, at 159. 
75 See Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. para. 61; Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 37, at 161. 
76 Cf. Siffror [Figures], Aftonbladet, supra note 73; Daily Mail, Standard Certifi-
cate of Circulation 2, available at http://www.abc.org.uk/Certificates/17193395.pdf 
(last visited May 20, 2012) (showing a UK national newspaper, with more comprehensive 
available data and overall per issue circulation comparable to Aftonbladet, has over 90,000 
copies of each issue circulate overseas). 
77 See Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 37, at 141–42. 
78 See infra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
79 See, e.g., Barbara Hagenbaugh et al., Job Cuts Deepen Across USA: Wave of Layoffs Here 
and in Europe Reflects Severity of the Recession, USA Today, Jan. 27, 2009, at 1A. 
80 Compare Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 37, at 142 (“[A]pplication of the propor-
tionality test is crucial for the outcome of whether . . . the national restriction on gambling 
is an infringement of the freedoms in the EC Treaty . . . .”), with Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 
paras. 40–45 (applying proportionality doctrine in an arguably cursory manner). 
81 See, e.g., Hagenbaugh et al., supra note 79. 
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it can certainly help to offset some of the downward trends in those ar-
eas.82 
 The remote gambling industry’s presence in the European labor 
market is hardly pervasive, but gambling operators have reported in-
creasing aggregate employment figures each year between 2000 and 
2009.83 Further, approximately fifteen percent of this growing number 
of jobs belongs to nationals of other Member States.84 Although these 
operators employ a large proportion of non-European nationals, this 
proportion has remained constant.85 Growth for these operators could 
therefore generate more jobs for Europeans.86 
 Some governments have recently tried to generate revenue by al-
lowing more gambling and taxing operators’ income.87 Italy reported 
“about €150 million in taxes last year as a result of a partial liberaliza-
tion of [online gambling].”88 In fact, Sweden considers such revenue 
generation to be an “incidental benefit” of its own regulatory scheme.89 
Although too few restrictions on private gambling operators might ac-
tually reduce government revenues by undermining State operators, 
court intervention favoring operators could precipitate a more pros-
perous, widespread, and efficient market for both private and public 
operators.90 
2. Sjöberg’s Reasoning Fails to Protect Lawful Cross-Border Gambling 
 The consequence of the ECJ’s failure to consider the scope of the 
Swedish newspapers is evident when relating another European na-
tional newspaper’s more-detailed foreign circulation figures to the basic 
figures of the Swedish papers.91 If Expressen and Aftonbladet’s com-
bined foreign circulation is two-fifths that of the Daily Mail, a U.K. na-
                                                                                                                      
82 See, e.g., Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra note 51, at 1419–26; Hagenbaugh 
et al., supra note 79; Eric Pfanner, Governments in Europe Warming to Online Gambling, N.Y. 
Times, July 28, 2010, at B2. 
83 Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra note 51, at 1422. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1422–23. 
86 See id. 
87 Pfanner, supra note 82 (stating that measures to ease domestic restrictions have been 
passed in France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Britain, while similar measures are being 
considered in Switzerland, Spain, and Germany). 
88 Id. 
89 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 27(2), 41. 
90 See Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra note 51, at xliii–xlvii. 
91 See Daily Mail, supra note 76, at 2 (showing large foreign circulation figures per is-
sue). 
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tional newspaper, then nearly 40,000 copies leave Sweden each day.92 
Then, even with only one reader per foreign issue,93 40,000 readers 
outside Sweden—about five percent of whom are likely online gam-
blers—would not see the advertisement.94 Yet despite such a possibility, 
the court’s non-analysis obviated Section 54’s extraterritorial effects, as 
only the nature, and not the scope of the prohibition was considered.95 
Further, the ‘discriminatory effect’ ground upon which Svea hovrätt 
eventually reversed Sjöberg’s and Gerdin’s convictions allows for the 
exact same restriction, so long as it is applied with equal force to a to-
tally distinct group of offenders.96 
C. A New Proposed Standard: Significant Foreign Burdens 
 The Sjöberg court should have instructed the Swedish courts that 
Section 54 contravenes Article 49 TEC if its application significantly 
burdens the provision of services between two foreign Member States.97 
This holding would be founded on the notion that the ban “go[es] be-
yond what is necessary” to affect any valid domestic justification.98 In so 
doing, the court would guide national courts to consider the effects 
that domestic provisions might have on Europe’s overall economic effi-
ciency.99 Such an instruction would also provide a substantive boundary 
that more precisely upholds the range of policy choices made by Mem-
ber States in the absence of EU online gambling legislation.100 
 The Liga Portuguesa case arguably presented an opportunity to in-
troduce such a standard, but Sjöberg presented a more compelling op-
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. The Daily Mail reaches just more than 4.5 million readers per day, while the 
Swedish papers together reach approximately two million readers per day. Compare Circulation 
& Readership, Mail Classified, http://www.mailclassified.co.uk/circulation-readership/ 
circulation-readership (last visited May 20, 2012) (showing 4,622,000 readers per weekday 
issue), with I Siffror, supra note 73 (showing 1,014,000 readers as print version’s range per 
day), and Siffror, supra note 73 (showing daily print version’s range as 925,550 readers). 
93 Cf. Circulation & Readership, supra note 92 (showing more than 2.25 readers per cir-
culated issue). 
94 See Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra note 51, at 1409. Under the proposed 
standard in Part III.C., a publication’s ability to run different ads in its foreign and domes-
tic editions would be relevant, and could patently mitigate a restriction’s effects, but it 
should not be assumed. 
95 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. paras. 40–45. 
96 See id. paras. 52–57 (allowing restriction if applied equally to persons promoting un-
licensed domestic gambling operations). 
97 See TEC art. 49. 
98 See Placanica, 2007 E.C.R. para. 62. 
99 See Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra note 51, at xxxiv, xliii–xlvii. 
100 See id. at 1414–19. 
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portunity.101 In Liga Portuguesa, a number of the Liga’s advertisements 
for Bwin appeared on non-circulating objects located in Portugal.102 
The court mentioned the possibility that foreigners viewed the Liga’s 
web advertisements, but did not incorporate that possibility into its 
proportionality analysis.103 Given Sjöberg’s more exclusive focus on the 
mere promotion of internet gambling, the Swedish newspapers’ poten-
tial foreign circulation, and Lotterilag Section 54’s ability to abridge the 
operation of lawful gambling elsewhere in the Common Market, the 
court missed its most prominent opportunity to date to establish a 
more refined standard for an evolving industry that needs one.104 
Conclusion 
 The European Court of Justice missed an opportunity in Criminal 
Proceedings Against Sjöberg & Another to announce a new standard check-
ing national gambling restrictions’ effects on the free movement of ser-
vices under Article 49 TEC. Had the ECJ advised the Swedish courts 
that extraterritorial effects of Sweden’s ban on the promotion of unli-
censed gambling render the ban contrary to Article 49, it could have 
induced Sweden to truly evaluate the scope of its restrictive gambling 
policy in the European market. Although Sweden’s restrictive policy 
may not necessarily harm the lawful gambling market in Europe, the 
possible foreign circulation of the banned advertisements suggests that 
it could. This possibility alone would validate an instruction to national 
courts to consider the foreign effects of their policies that restrict the 
movement of services, especially during a time of economic difficulty. 
 
101 See Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Departamento de Jogos 
da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa, [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, para. 25 (stating that the 
Liga’s internet ads “mak[e] it possible for consumers in Portugal and other States to use 
[Bwin’s] gambling services,” but failing to state the scope of the use by consumers in other 
States) (emphasis added). 
102 See id. (stadiums and player uniforms). 
103 See id. paras. 25, 60–68. 
104 See Sjöberg, [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. para. 58(1); Swiss Inst. of Comparative Law, supra 
note 51, at xlvi–xlvii. 
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